Central Pathology Service Medical
Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court: Statute

Limiting Punitive Damages for the
Professional Negligence of Health Care
Providers Includes Intentional Torts

The nation's attention is focused on health care policy and an
essential element of health care policy is tort reform. California
began its medical malpracticereform in 1975 when the legislature
enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).
Enacted in response to rapid increases in medical malpractice insurance premiums, MICRA set monetary caps on noneconomic
damage and attorney fee awards.
Recently, in Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v.
Superior Court the California Supreme Court extended this policy
to punitive damages and intentional torts. After Central Pathology, every plaintiff injured by a health care provider must comply
with section 452.13 of the California Civil Procedure Code provided the injuries are directly related to the provision of professional services. Section 452.13 requires a pretrialdetermination of
whether a punitive damage claim has a substantialprobability of
prevailing. Further, the statute applies to intentional torts, in
which the plaintiff is injured by treatment to which the plaintiff
did not consent. This Casenote analyzes whether additionalprocedural obstacles are warrantedfor victims of the intentional torts
of health care providers, whether any potential decrease in damage awards may create a disincentive for attorneys to take these
cases, and whether the court's holding broadens other statutes

concerning the professional negligence of health care providers.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior
Court,1 the California Supreme Court held that the statute limiting

punitive damages in cases involving professional negligence of a
health care provider 2 applies to intentional torts, if the injury caused
by the provider is directly related to the provision of professional
services.

The California Supreme Court analyzed the language and legislative history of section 425.13 of the California Civil Procedure Code,
and disapproved an earlier statutory construction by the court of appeal in Bommareddy v. Superior Court.3 The court's inclusion of

intentional torts within the definition of professional negligence
broadens the scope of professional negligence beyond its usual application.4 Further, by placing strict procedural burdens on all punitive
damage claims, the decision will create less incentive for plaintiff's
lawyers to take medical malpractice cases, which are often expensive
and complex.5
1. 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992).
2. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.13 (West Supp. 1993).
3. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990), overruled by Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992). See infra part II.C, for a discussion of the facts and holding in
Bommareddy.
4. Usually negligence and intentional torts are considered separate bases for liability. See; e.g., Review of Selected 1975 Legislation, 7 PAC. L.J. 544, 546, 557 (1976)
(analyzing the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act which uses the phrase "professional negligence" in six statutory sections) [hereinafter Selected 1975 Legislation]. See
infra part II.B, for discussion of the statutory definitions of professional negligence.
This is the third major case within the past year in which the supreme court has creatively construed a statute against a tort plaintiff. In Ford v. Gouin, a waterskier sued
the driver of a ski boat for injuries the waterskier sustained when he struck a tree branch
overhanging a narrow river channel through which he was waterskiing barefoot and
backwards. The court stated that § 658 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, which
provides that the driver of a boat towing a person on water skis has a duty to operate the
boat in such a manner so as to prevent the skier from striking an object or person, did
not apply to the defendant. The statute was intended to safeguard only the lives and
property of third persons with whom a waterskier may collide, therefore the plaintiff was
not in the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. Ford v. Gouin, 3 Cal. 4th
339, 834 P.2d 724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992). In Ornelas v. Randolph, the court construed § 846 of the Civil Code broadly and exempted the defendant landowner from the
general duty of reasonable care for injuries sustained by a minor child who was injured
while playing near stored farm equipment. The court held that children playing on stored
farm equipment constituted a recreational activity, falling within the statute's exemption
from the ordinary duty of care. Ornealas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993).
5. Medical malpractice cases require expert testimony and the litigation is often
complex and expensive. Plaintiffs' attorneys, working on a contingency basis, must essentially finance these cases out of their own pockets. See generally, PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 19, 28 (1991). Statutory restrictions on noneconomic
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The issue raised by this decision is whether the supreme court interpreted the statute too broadly. All plaintiffs seeking punitive damages for injuries caused by medical malpractice are now brought
under the mandate of this statute, regardless of the nature of the
defendant's conduct. The decision also carries significant implications for other statutes concerning the professional negligence of
health care providers. This includes those statutes that limit the recovery of noneconomic damages, 6 allow for periodic payments of future damages, 7 and allow for admission of evidence of collateral
benefits paid to the plaintiff. 8 Therefore, this decision will affect the
amount of recovery, and timing for payment, in future actions
against health care providers regardless of the theory of liability.
This Casenote discusses the Central Pathology decision and analyzes its implications. Part II provides the legislative and case law
background for the application of punitive damages against health
care providers. Part III reviews the facts, procedural history, and the
majority's opinion in Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc.

v. Superior Court. Part IV is an analysis of the decision including a
discussion of whether the court properly construed the statute. It
also discusses the implications of this decision on the construction of
other statutes and its effect on future cases. Part V concludes that
the supreme court properly applied the legislative policy of protecting health care providers from unsubstantiated claims for punitive
damages. Nonetheless, the statute, as construed, fails to protect the
class of patients injured by medical treatment that is different from
or exceeds the patient's consent. Further clarification by the legislature is needed to relieve these patients of the additional procedural
burdens imposed by section 425.13.

damages and contingency fees, however, create disincentives for a lawyer to take a case
unless there is the potential for a large damage award. See generally, infra notes 24-25,
for a description of special legislation limiting damage awards and attorneys' contingency
fees for medical malpractice cases. Thus, plaintiffs suffering medical injuries may be
unable to find a lawyer to take their case because the case would not be cost-effective for
the lawyer working on a contingency basis.
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1993).
7. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1987).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1993).

II. BACKGROUND
A.

Legislation Affecting Punitive Damages Against Health Care
Providers

Section 425.13 of the Civil Procedure Code was added as one section of the Brown-Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987
(CLRA). 9 That section of CLRA provides that in any action arising
out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, no claim
for punitive damages is allowed in the original complaint. 10 Plaintiffs
must make a motion seeking the court's approval for an amended
pleading claiming punitive damages."
In 1988, the legislature amended section 425.13, clarifying the
statute's intent.' 2 The statute, as amended, is specifically intended to
protect health care providers from unsubstantiated claims of punitive
damages in actions alleging professional negligence.1 3 The legislature
was concerned that section 425.13, as originally enacted, could be
interpreted to protect health care providers from punitive damage
claims that were based on conduct unrelated to the practitioner's

professional activities. 4 The procedure established by section 425.13
protects health care providers by creating a pretrial hearing mechanism in which a court evaluates the legitimacy of a punitive damage
claim before allowing the claim to proceed.' 5 On the basis of supporting and opposing affidavits, a court may grant a motion for leave
9. Willie L. Brown, Jr. - Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch.
1498, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777 [hereinafter CLRA] (amending § 6146 of the Business and
Professions Code, and §§ 3294 and 3295 of the Civil Code; adding § 1714.45 to the
Civil Code, and Title 13.5 to Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code; and adding § 425.13
to the Civil Procedure Code).
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West Supp. 1993). "Health care provider" is defined in § 425.13(b) as:
[A]ny person licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with
Section 500) of the Business and Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to the
Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1440) of Division 2 of the
Health and Safety Code; and any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility,
licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of the Health
and Safety Code, "Health care provider" includes the legal representatives of a
health care provider.
11. Id. § 425.13(a).
12. Act of Sept. 22, 1988, ch. 1204, sec. 1, 1988 Cal. Stat. 4021, ch. 1205, sec. 1,
1988 Cal. Stat. 4028.
13.

ASSEMBLY

SUBCOMM. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REP. ON S. BILL

1420, at 1 (1987-88 Reg. Sess.).
14. Id. As originally enacted, § 425.13 states that "no claim for punitive damages
against a health care provider shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless
the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed." CLRA, supra note 9, at 5782.
15. Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181,
-189, 832 P.2d 924, 929, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 213 (1992).
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to amend a complaint provided the plaintiff has established, pursuant to section 3294 of the Civil Code, a substantial probability of
prevailing. 6 Section 3294 concerns punitive damages in general and
was amended by the CLRA. 17 Punitive damages are available in certain actions for the purpose of punishing the defendant and deterring
others from similar conduct.'

CLRA increased the evidentiary bur-

den for recovery of punitive damages to clear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression, or fraud.'" CLRA also redefined malice

to include "despicable20 conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard 2 ' of the rights or safety of
others." 22 These changes reflect the legislature's23 attempt to ensure
greater validity in claims for punitive damages.
The potential for recovery of punitive damages becomes particularly important in light of special legislation - the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) - which limits the recovery

16. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West Supp. 1993).
17. CLRA, supra note 9, at 5780-81.
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a). With the purpose of punitive damages to punish
the defendant rather than compensate the plaintiff, more than mere negligence is required. Conduct subject to punitive damages has been described as "circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on the
part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of
others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9-10 (5th ed. 1984).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1993). See infra note 22 for
the statutory definitions of malice, oppression, and fraud.
20. "Despicable" is defined as meriting hatred, scorn, or loathing. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 614 (Philip B. Gove ed. 1986).
21. Conscious disregard requires establishing "that the defendant was aware of the
probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately
failed to avoid those consequences." Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895-96,
598 P.2d 854, 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1979).
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(1) (emphasis added). CLRA added the words despicable and willful to the definition of malice. Section 3294(c) includes the following
definitions of malice, oppression, and fraud:
"Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
"Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
"Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a
material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the
defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise
causing injury.
Id.
23. Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181,
189, 832 P.2d 924, 929, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 213 (1992).

of damages in medical malpractice cases.24 MICRA added section
3333.2 of the Civil Code, which places a $250,000 cap on
noneconomic losses based on a health care provider's professional
negligence.2 5 Plaintiffs with large damage claims could be undercompensated as a result of this legislation. Punitive damages provide an
appealing alternative method for recovering larger damage awards.
Unlike the MICRA statutes, the statute controlling punitive damages, section 3294 of the Civil Code, does not place a cap on the

recovery of punitive damages.2 6 The general rule governing the

amount of punitive damage awards is that the award must bear a

reasonable relationship to the actual damages applied. Plaintiffs
seeking punitive damages against a health care provider may also be
required to meet the heavy evidentiary burden imposed by section
425.13 of the Civil Procedure Code.28 Whether a plaintiff's claim
24. See Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch. 1, 1975 Cal. Stat 3949 (2d
Ex. Sess.) [hereinafter MICRA]. MICRA was enacted by an extraordinary legislative
session in response to a perceived crisis in California's medical malpractice industry. See
Selected 1975 Legislation, supra note 4, at 544. This crisis consisted of a dramatic increase in medical malpractice premiums. In protest, medical professionals threatened
work slowdowns. In response, the legislature formed an extraordinary session which resulted in passage of MICRA. The purpose of the legislation was to effect a reduction in
insurance premiums by making reforms in the medical, legal, and insurance fields. In
part, MICRA consists of laws affecting medical quality, the timing of claims, attorneys'
fees, and the methods for protesting insurance premium rates. Id. at 544-45.
Initially MICRA was the focus of constitutional attacks. See, e.g., R. Scott Jenkins &
Wm. C. Schweinfurth, Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act:
An Equal ProtectionChallenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 829 (1979); Geri O'Brien, Comment,
Medical Malpractice- $250,000 Cap on Pain & Suffering - Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2
- Does the Statute Meet Its ConstitutionalBurden and Legislative Goals?, 8 WniTTIERt
L. REV. 601 (1986). California courts have held that the provisions of MICRA are constitutionally valid. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695
P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985) ($250,000 cap on noneconomic loss recovery did not
violate due process or the equal protection clause as discriminatory against medical tort
victims because the statute was rationally related to a legitimate state objective).
25. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1993). In addition to placing a cap on
noneconomic damages, MICRA also places limitations on attorneys' contingency fees for
representing persons seeking damages against a health care provider based on the provider's professional negligence. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1990). The fee
schedule was amended by CLRA and current limitations are as follows:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) recovered.
(4) Fifteen percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds six hundred thousand
dollars ($600,000).
Id.
Another MICRA provision allows for periodic payments, rather than lump-sum payment, at the request of any party, provided the award equals or exceeds fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000) in future damages. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1987).
26. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993).
27. E.g., Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal. App. 2d 723, 727, 7 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212 (1960).
28. Although § 425.13 places no cap on the recovery of punitive damages, the
plaintiff must establish a substantial probability of prevailing pursuant to § 3294 of the
Civil Code, and the plaintiff must comply with the timing requirements imposed by
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falls within this statute will depend on the construction of key
phrases

in 2 9the statute:

"arising

out

of"

and "professional

negligence.
B.

Legislation Defining the Professional Negligence of Health
Care Providers

Section 425.13 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to actions
"arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider."3 "Professional negligence" is not defined in this section of
the Civil Procedure Code. Instead, it is defined in section 2 of CLRA
which amends section 6146 of the Business and Professions Code. 31
This section of the Business and Professions Code was amended in
1975 as part of MICRA.32 The definition of professional negligence
under MICRA is:
[A] negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of
a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that the services are within
the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not
within any
restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed
3
hospital .

A key issue raised by this definition is whether intentional torts

are within the scope of "professional negligence." 34 In one commentary reviewing MICRA, 5 the legislative intent was interpreted as
making a distinction between intentional torts and professional
negligence:'
§ 425.13 of the Civil Procedure Code.

29. This was the focus of the CentralPathology decision. 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d
924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992). The supreme court opinion construing these statutes is
discussed in part III, infra.
30. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West Supp. 1993).
31. CLRA, supra note 9, at 5778.
32. MICRA, supra note 24, at 3993. Of significance to the issue of punitive damages are the six sections of MICRA which all contain the same definition of professional
negligence: §§ 364, 667.7, and 1295 of the Civil Procedure Code; § 6146 of the Business
and Professions Code; and §§ 3333.1 and 3333.2 of the Civil Code.
33. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(3) (West 1990).
34. See Bommareddy v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d. 1017, 272 Cal. Rptr.
246 (1990), overruled by Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992) (discussed infra part II.C);
Feister v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 223, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (1991), review
granted, 824 P.2d 570, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 764 (1991), review dismissed, 838 P.2d 781, 13
Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (1992) (also discussed infra part II.C); Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208
(1992) (facts and opinion are reviewed infra part III).
35. See, e.g., Selected 1975 Legislation, supra note 4, at 557.

From the outset, it seems notable that the legislature chose to specifically
regulate only those actions brought upon a theory of "professional negligence," as defined as a negligent act or omission by a health care provider
in the rendering of professional services which cause personal injuries or
wrongful death. Hence, a "malpractice" action brought on a theory of an
unconsented-to-battery upon the patient, breach of warranty, or other nonnegligence theory would apparently be without the ambit of this
legislation. 8

C. California Law Prior to Central Pathology

1. The Fifth District
In Bommareddy v. Superior Court37 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal construed the phrase "professional negligence" in the context
of section 425.13. In Bommareddy, the plaintiff's complaint included
a cause of action for battery alleging that the defendant opthamologist operated on the plaintiff's right eye without the plaintiff's con-

sent. 38 -The doctor argued that the phrase "professional negligence"
in section 425.13 of the Civil Procedure Code should include any
cause of action arising out of the provision of medical services, and
that the plaintiff's battery cause of action was inseparable from her
negligence claim.3 9 The court of appeal held that the term "professional negligence" as it appears in section 425.13 of the Civil Procedure Code is the same term of art that appears in the MICRA
legislation. 40 The court then concluded that "'[p]rofessional negligence'

. . .

does not include intentional torts, such as battery, even

'' 41
when occurring during the provision of medical services.

36. Id.
37. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990), overruled by Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992). Punitive damages were allowed against health care providers
prior to the enactment of § 425.13. See Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 676 (1984) (arbitrator had the authority to award punitive damages in a claim
asserting intentional and negligent causes of action when the plaintiff developed a severe
post-operative infection following breast reduction surgery); See also Nelson v. Gaunt,
125 Cal. App. 3d 623, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1981) (punitive damages allowed for assault
and battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress when a doctor injected
non-FDA-approved silicone into the plaintiff's breasts without disclosing the substance or
the dangers of the injection to the patient).
38. The plaintiff alleged she consented to tear duct surgery on her left eye, not a
cataract extraction with an intraocular lens implant on her right eye. Bommareddy, 222
Cal. App. 3d at 1018, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
39. Id. at 1019, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
40. Id. at 1023, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
41. Id. at 1024, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 250. The Bommareddy court relied on earlier
California decisions that followed the same general view that professional negligence is
separate from intentional torts. In Cobbs v. Grant, a medical malpractice case concerning
informed consent, the court mentioned that "a doctor could be held liable for punitive
damages under a battery count ...." 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr.

Central Pathology Service v. Superior Court
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2.

The First District

The First District Court of Appeal in Feister v. Superior Court42

disagreed with Bommareddy and found that actions for intentional
torts are within the scope of section 425.13. 43 In Feister, a medical
malpractice case concerning the medical management of the plain-

tiff's rectal cancer, the plaintiff's complaint included causes of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing."' The trial court denied the plaintiffs
motion for leave to amend seeking punitive damages.4 5 In denying
505, 512 (1972) (discussing the consequences of a battery or negligence theory). In Noble v. Superior Court, a case concerning the timing of a "Notice of Intention to Commence Action" under § 364 of the Civil Procedure Code, the court compared the term
"professional negligence" under MICRA to another section that did not use this phrase.
191 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 1192-93, 237 Cal. Rptr. 38, 40 (1987). The Noble court noted
that § 1295 of the Civil Procedure Code (governing arbitration provisions in medical
services contracts) contained the phrase "any dispute as to medical malpractice," not the
phrase "professional negligence" which the court considered a more limited phrase. Id.
The court then mentioned that the distinction between negligence and battery was "not
lost on our Supreme Court, and we do not believe it was lost on the Legislature ....
Id. at 1194, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
42. 7 Cal. App. 4th 223, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (1991), review granted, 824 P.2d
570, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 764 (1991), and review dismissed, 838 P.2d 781, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
53 (1992). Feister and Bommareddy are the only appellate court decisions construing the
meaning of profesgional negligence under § 425.13 prior to Central Pathology.
43. Id. at 226, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
44. Id. at 228-29, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-53. The plaintiff's complaint included six
causes of action. The first cause of action was against her physician for professional
negligence in failing to properly and adequately diagnose the plaintiff's condition. The
plaintiff alleged that this negligence lead to her second cause of action against her physician for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Her third cause of action was directed
against the defendant hospital for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff
alleged that the hospital was aware of her susceptibility to mental suffering, yet after
being informed for the first time that she had cancer and only a 50 percent chance of
surviving the surgery, the hospital told her surgery would not be performed and neither
defendant would continue to treat her. Her fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was directed against both defendants and was based on the
facts underlying the second and third causes of action. The fifth cause of action was
brought by her husband for loss of consortium. Her sixth cause of action against both
defendants was for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. This cause of action
incorporated the allegations of medical negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Id.
45. Id. at 227, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151. On March 1, 1990, the plaintiffs filed a
petition for a writ of mandate which was denied by the First District. The supreme court
denied review of that decision. Id. Subsequently, the Fifth District filed its opinion in
Bommareddy on August 8, 1990. On August 23, 1990, plaintiffs filed another petition for
a writ of mandate based on the Bommareddy decision. The First District again denied
the petition, but the supreme court granted review and remanded the matter to the First
District with directions to issue an alternative writ, hear formal argument, and decide the
matter. Id. at 227, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151-52. This Casenote discusses the First District's
latest decision as directed by the supreme court.

plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate, the court of appeal focused
on the legislative intent.4 6 According to the First District, if "the
gravamen of the complaint arises from alleged medical malpractice,"
any claim for punitive damages must be subject to judicial review
under section 425.13.7
III.

CENTRAL PATHOLOGY SERVICE MEDICAL CLINIC, INC. V.
SUPERIOR COURT

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
Plaintiffs Constance and Michael Hull filed a medical malpractice
claim against multiple defendants including Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc., Central Pathology Service Medical Group,
Inc., Elizabeth Irwin, M.D., and Elizabeth Irwin, M.D., Inc.4 The
original claim asserted causes of action for negligence and loss of
consortium. 9
Two months before the scheduled trial, plaintiffs moved for leave
to amend the complaint so as to add causes of action for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 0 The plaintiffs sought punitive damages for these additional claims. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs made the following allegations: (1) Dr. Irwin
performed a pap smear on Constance Hull and sent the specimen to
the defendant lab for analysis; (2) the defendant lab failed to notify
Mrs. Hull that she was developing cancer, despite the presence of
abnormal cells in her specimen; (3) after the defendant lab was ordered to retest all persons tested in the past five years, the lab intentionally failed to notify Mrs. Hull that she should be retested; and
(4) Dr. Irwin denied using the defendant lab in an effort to conceal
her medical negligence. 5' In asserting intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants acted in an
outrageous manner with the intent to cause severe emotional
distress."2
Defendants opposed the motion for leave to amend the complaint
on the grounds that it failed to satisfy the requirements of subsection
425.13(a) of the Civil Procedure Code.5 The defendants argued that
under the statute the plaintiffs motion was untimely, and that the
46.
47.
48.
185, 832
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 232-33, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
Id. at 233, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181,
P.2d 924, 926, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 210 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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plaintiffs would be unable to establish a substantial probability of
prevailing on their punitive damage claim.5 4 The plaintiffs argued
55

that section 425.13 did not apply to the amended causes of action.

The trial court, relying on Bommareddy v. Superior Court,,6

granted the plaintiffs motion, holding that fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress did not fall within the meaning of pro-

fessional negligence under section 425.13 .5 The defendants sought a
writ of mandate from the court of appeal directing the trial court to

deny the plaintiffs' motion, but the court of appeal summarily denied
defendants petition.5 8 Subsequently, the California Supreme Court
granted review.
B. Majority Opinion
1. Legislative Intent
The California Supreme Court construed section 425.13 by exam-

ining the legislative intent. First, the court examined the statutory
language for the meaning of "professional negligence" and "arising

out of."' 59 The court determined that "professional negligence" as
used in section 425.13 has the same definition as the phrase "profes-

sional negligence" in MICRA. 0 The phrase "arising out of' is not
defined in section 425.13 or any of the MICRA statutes. The court

used the definition "origination, growth or flow from the event" from
the definition of "arising out of" used in earlier cases.61 The court
then noted that the question of whether an intentional tort can "arise
54. Id.
55. Id. For the plaintiffs to recover punitive damages, it was essential that their
claim not fall within the scope of § 425.13. Section 425.13 requires plaintiffs to file their
motion within two years of filing and not less than nine months before the date the
matter is first set for trial, whichever is earlier. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a)
(West Supp. 1993). Here, because the plaintiffs made their motion just two months
before the case was scheduled for trial, the motion would be untimely under the statute.
56. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990), overruled by Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992).
57. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 185, 832 P.2d at 927, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
211.
58. Id. at 186, 832 P.2d at 927, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211:
59. Id. at 186-87, 832 P.2d at 927-28, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211-12.
60. Id. at 187, 832 P.2d at 928, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text for the MICRA definition of professional negligence.
61. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 187, 832 P.2d at 928, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
212.

out of" professional negligence was not clear from the statutory language.62 An examination of the legislative history was required to
answer this question.
The legislative history of CLRA suggests that two major goals of
the act were to increase the evidentiary threshold for recovering punitive damages, and to create a pretrial hearing mechanism for eliminating unsubstantiated claims for punitive damages against health
care providers.6 3 The court focused on the 1988 amendment of section 425.13 and concluded that because the chief purpose of the
amendment was to protect health care providers in their capacity as
practitioners, the legislature did not intend to exclude intentional
torts from the statute.6 4 This is in direct conflict with the interpretation of section 425.13 by the appellate court in Bommareddy.3
2. Disapproval of Bommareddy
The Central Pathology court disapproved of Bommareddy on
three grounds. 6 First, the court determined that the Bommareddy
court's focus on the relationship between intentional torts and negligence was misplaced. 67 The Central Pathology court determined
that the question is not whether professional negligence includes intentional torts, but whether the injury for which damages are sought
"arises out of' the professional services provided by the health care
provider. 68 Second, the court determined that the Bommareddy decision would render the statute virtually meaningless because there are
so few punitive damage claims that do not involve intentional torts."
A narrow interpretation limited to negligence causes of action would
be inconsistent with the legislature's intent to protect health care
providers from frivolous, unsubstantiated claims for punitive damages.70 Third, the Bommareddy interpretation allows for artful
pleading to avoid application of the statute. By merely including a
cause of action based on an intentional tort, the plaintiff would avoid
section 425.13 and thereby defeat the legislative intent. 1
62. Id. at 188, 832 P.2d at 928, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212.
63. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text discussing the statutory history
of CLRA and the subsequent 1988 amendment of § 425.13 of the Civil Procedure Code.
64. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 190, 832 P.2d at 929, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
213. This point is discussed further in part IV.A, infra.
65. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990), overruled by Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992). See supra part II.C.
66. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 190-92, 832 P.2d at 930-31, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 214-15.
67. Id. at 190, 832 P.2d at 930, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214.
68. Id. at 191, 832 P.2d at 930, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214.
69. Id.
70. Id. This point is analyzed further in part IV.B, infra.
71. Id. This problem is discussed further in part IV.C, infra.
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3.

Scope of Section 425.13 and Application to Facts

The-court noted "that in the medical malpractice context, there
may be considerable overlap of intentional and negligent causes of
action. 1 2 To preserve the legislative intent, the court concluded the
statute could not be limited to negligent acts or omissions.7 3 Inten-

tional torts could "arise out of professional negligence" if the injury
caused by them is directly related to the provision of professional

services.7 4 The statute would even apply to situations where the
health care provider committed battery by providing treatment that

exceeded, or was different from, the treatment for which the patient
consented.73
In Central Pathology, the plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud were both directly related to the

defendants provision of professional services.76 The alleged injuries
resulted from the manner in which defendants performed and communicated the results of medical tests.7 7 This is an ordinary and
usual part of the provision of medical services, and thus within the
scope of section 425.13.78
The supreme court ruled that the court of appeal erred in denying
defendant's petition for a writ of mandate.7 9 An alternative writ of
mandate was issued directing the court of appeal to order the trial
court to vacate its order granting plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend the complaint. 80

72. Id. at 192, 832 P.2d at 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. This broad application of § 425.13 particularly disturbed Justice Mosk. Id.
at 193, 832 P.2d at 932, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 216 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Mosk viewed the majority approach as virtually eliminating any possibility of
punitive damages against a health care provider, regardless of the provider's conduct. In
particular, he was concerned about unauthorized treatment exceeding a patient's consent.
Justice Mosk considered this battery which should not be shielded from punitive damages
solely because the battery was committed by a health care provider. Id. This point is
discussed in part IV.D, infra.
76. Id. at 192-93, 832 P.2d at 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 193, 832 P.2d at 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
79. Id.
80. Id.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Did the Court Correctly Determine the Legislative Intent?

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that courts
should ascertain the intent of the legislature to ensure the purpose of
the law is correctly effectuated."1 In determining the legislative intent, the court should give the statutory words their usual, ordinary
meaning. 812 The plain words "professional negligence" indicates a
cause of action distinct from an intentional tort.8 3 However, statutory construction requires consideration of the purpose of the law,s4
and courts should adopt a construction that furthers that purpose.
A literal interpretation of the words should not prevail if it creates a
result contrary to the apparent intent of the legislature.,

As dis-

cussed in Part II, section B, the supreme court concluded that compliance with the legislative intent required including intentional torts
within the statute."" The question is whether the supreme court construed the statute too broadly in its attempt to effectuate the legisla-

tive intent. 87

The statute could be interpreted as providing protection for health

care providers only for negligent acts or omissions. 8 If the statute
were intended to include intentional torts, the legislature could have

excluded the limiting term "professional negligence," and used wording similar to that in section 1295 of the
Civil Procedure Code:89
"any dispute as to medical malpractice." 90 A report by the Assembly Subcommittee on the Administration of Justice indicates that the
major purpose of the 1988 amendment of section 425.13 was to limit
81. E.g., People v. Hull, 1 Cal. 4th 266, 271, 820 P.2d 1036, 1040, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
526, 530 (1991).
82. Id.
83. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See also Bommarcddy v. Superior
Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 1023, 272 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (1990) ("'[P]rofessional
negligence' . . . has a specific meaning which does not include unconsented-to battery
upon a patient."), overruled by Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992).
84. E.g., Robinson v.. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. 4th 226, 234,
825 P.2d 767, 770-71, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 785-86 (1992).
85. E.g., Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 44 Cal. 3d 231,
235, 746 P.2d 871, 873, 242 Cal. Rptr. 732, 734 (1988).
86. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 192, 832 P.2d at 93i, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
215.
87. Justice Mosk claimed the majority went too far: "the majority paint with much
too broad a brush in their apparent desire to eliminate any possibility of punitive damages against a medical provider, no matter how egregious the conduct." Id. at 193, 832
P.2d at 932, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 216 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
88. That would be consistent with the Bommareddy view, supra part II.C.
89. CAL.CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (governing arbitration provisions
in medical services contracts).
90. See Noble v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 1193, 237 Cal. Rptr. 38,
40 (1987) (emphasis added).
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the statute's scope.9 1 Comment one of that report stated: "This bill is
intended to correct an oversight. As written, Section 425.13 could
apply to any lawsuit against any health care provider . . . .Arguably, this could include lawsuits unrelated to the practitioner's practice, such as defamation, fraud, and intentional torts.' ' 92 The
supreme court concluded that this reference to intentional torts in
comment one did not undercut the central purpose of the amendment in protecting health care providers in their capacity as
practitioners. 9"
Nevertheless, it is plausible to interpret the plain language of the
statute opposite to the supreme court's view. The present statutory
language could be read as imposing two requirements. First, the injury must be caused by a negligent act or omission in the traditional
sense. Second, the act or omission must directly result from the
health care provider's treatment.9 4
B.

Would Exclusion of Intentional Torts Render the Statute
Meaningless?

The California Supreme Court was also concerned that excluding
intentional torts from section 425.13 would render the statute meaningless because there are few situations in which punitive damages
are not based on intentional tort causes of action. 95 However, punitive damages may be awarded for unintentional torts. Section 3294
of the Civil Code expressly provides for punitive damages for unintentional torts if the defendant's conduct is despicable and in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others.96
Punitive damages are used to punish the defendant and deter
others from similar conduct. 97 Therefore, the availability of punitive
damages does not depend on the distinction between intentional or
unintentional torts, but rather the egregiousness of the defendant's
91.
cmt. 1.

ASSEMBLY SUBCOMM. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 13,

92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181,
190, 832 P.2d 924, 929, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 213 (1992).

94. The injury must be caused by an act or omission that

was the proximate cause

of the plaintiff's injury. "Professional" negligence requires that the act or omission is by
a health care provider. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993).

95.

Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 191, 832 P.2d at 930, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

96.

CAL.

97.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

214.

CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993).

conduct. 98 Most often this type of conduct is intentional, but the pos-

sibility that such egregious conduct could result from unintentional
acts or omissions is not so remote as to render the statute meaningless. For example, in Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital,99 the trial
court refused to instruct the jury on punitive damages because there
was a lack of evidence that the defendant hospital consciously disregarded the safety of others when it renewed a physician's staff privi-

leges.' 0 0 Nevertheless, had the hospital renewed the physician's staff

privileges with knowledge that the physician was an incompetent
surgeon or posed a threat to patients' safety, punitive damages would

have been available.' 0 ' Thus, exclusion of intentional torts from section 425.13 will narrow the statute's application, but it will not
render the statute meaningless. 02

98. See Bommareddy v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 1020, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 246, 248 (1990), overruled by Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992) (mentioning
that the supreme court has never drawn a "bright line" distinction between intentional
and unintentional torts for the availability of punitive damages). See also Taylor V. Superior Court, in which the supreme court allowed a claim for punitive damages holding
"one who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate
a motor vehicle demonstrates . . . 'such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.'" 24 Cal. 3d 890, 899,
598 P.2d 854, 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (1979).
99. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 260 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1989).
100. Id. at 1038, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 887. In this case, the plaintiff recovered economic and noneconomic damages when her 16 year-old son died from surgery negligently
performed by a hospital staff physician. The plaintiff also sued for punitive damages
claiming that when the hospital renewed the surgeon's staff privileges, it failed to investigate warnings about the doctor's possible incompetence. Id. at 1037-38, 260 Cal. Rptr. at
886-87. The physician who performed the surgery was previously denied renewal of staff
privileges at Grossmont Hospital, and also had his surgical privileges revoked at Mercy
Hospital. Id. at 1039, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
101. Id. at 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
102. Examples where unintentional torts have given rise to claims for punitive
damages include Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (child suffered injury
and death caused by pre-natal oxygen deficiency when the obstetrician admitted lowering
his standard of care at night by having routine orders not to disturb him until "crowning," the stage of labor when the baby's head reaches the vaginal opening); Strauss v.
Biggs, 525 A.2d 992 (Del. 1987) (permanent nerve injury caused by a misplaced surgical
incision for a purported fasciotomy which the defendant podiatrist in fact did not complete; and complicated by the podiatrist's failure to refer the plaintiff to the appropriate
specialists); Medvecz v. Choi, 569 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1977) (jury was allowed to decide
the issue of punitive damages if the anesthesiologist was found to have abandoned the
patient during surgery); Short v. Downs, 537 P.2d 754 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (patient
suffered injuries following defendant physician's injection of silicone labeled "not for
human use" into the patient's breasts).
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C. Would Exclusion of Intentional TOrts from Section 425.13
Allow Plaintiffs an Escape from the Statute Through Artful
Pleading?

The best argument for including intentional torts within the scope
of section 425.13 is that exclusion would provide plaintiffs an oppor-

tunity to avoid the statute's requirements through artful pleading. 0 3

In a claim involving medical malpractice, plaintiffs could file a complaint alleging negligence along with a cause of action alleging some
kind of intentional tort, which would serve as the basis for punitive
damages. 04
Statutes must be construed to avoid absurd results, 0 5 yet exclusion of intentional torts may result in the statute never being applied.
This is inconsistent with the legislative goal of requiring pretrial judicial scrutiny of punitive damage claims filed against health care
providers. 106 Sidestepping the requirements of section 425.13 will not
guarantee plaintiffs success in recovering punitive damages, 1 ' but
the threat of punitive damages could be used by plaintiffs to coerce a
more favorable settlement. 108 High settlements coerced through the
threat of punitive damages would undermine the general legislative
philosophy of limiting damage awards in medical malpractice
claims.' 0 9
D. Implications for Future Cases

The California Supreme Court's ruling in Central Pathology ensures that all claims for punitive damages asserted against health
103. See Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
4th 181, 191, 832 P.2d 924, 930, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 214 (1992); Feister v. Superior
Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 223, 233, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 155 (1991), review granted, 824
P.2d 570, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 764 (1992), and review dismissed, 838 P.2d 781, 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d 53 (1992).
104. The plaintiff would then claim to seek punitive damages only in connection
with the intentional tort. CentralPathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 191, 832 P.2d at 930, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 214; Feister, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 233, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
105. People v. Morris, 46 Cal. 3d 1, 15, 756 P.2d 843, 851, 249 Cal. Rptr. 119,
127 (1988).
106. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 191, 832 P.2d at 930, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
214; Feister,7 Cal. App. 4th at 233, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
107. Plaintiffs must still meet the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of
§ 3294 of the Civil Code. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1993).
108. See generally, Feister, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 234 n.5, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57
n.5.
109. See generally, MICRA, supra note 24; Selected 1975 Legislation, supra note
4.

care providers must comply with the pretrial hearing mechanism imposed by section 425.13.110 Procedural devices aimed at discouraging

punitive damages in the medical setting are consistent with the underlying policy of limiting medical malpractice claims in general. " '
Whether this is sound policy to begin with is debatable. 1 2 Nevertheless, within the framework of this policy the question is what types of
cases, if any, should give rise to punitive damages in the medical
setting? Under the Central Pathology court's view, all cases arising
out -of the professional's treatment of the patient must come under

judicial scrutiny before punitive damages may be pleaded, regardless
of the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct. This includes cases
alleging battery where a practitioner performs treatment exceeding
or different from that to which a plaintiff consented.' 1 3 Though this
approach facilitates the legislative polices described above, it may be
unfair to this group of patients. l

4

The relationship between health care providers and patients is a
special consent-based relationship whereby the provider is authorized
to touch and examine the patient in a manner that exceeds the usual
legal limit for such bodily contact." 5 The relationship is also special
because of the trust patients must place in the provider's skill and
knowledge concerning medical matters which are beyond the average
110. Provided the basis for the claim arises from the practitioner's professional
conduct. See supra part III.B. The pretrial mechanism imposes an elevated evidentiary
burden on plaintiffs. See supra part II.A.
111. See, e.g., supra notes 24-25, detailing the impetus for the MICRA legislation.
112. The underlying policy of discouraging medical malpractice claims by limiting
damages, contingency fees, and imposing additional procedural burdens may be unsound.
Supporters of the tort system claim that the true cause of escalating malpractice litigation and insurance costs is the large amount of medical malpractice that actually occurs.
The American Law Institute Reporters suggest that more, not fewer, medical tort claims
are needed. See 1 AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 297 (1991) [hereinafter ALI STUDY]. The ALI reports
that studies show less than 30,000 malpractice claims are paid each year out of an estimated 300,000 medical injuries. Id. at 295-96.
The need to compensate injured patients must be weighed against physicians' legitimate concerns about escalating liability costs. Physicians in high risk specialties (such as
obstetrics or neurosurgery) are subject to large, rapid rate hikes in their malpractice
insurance premiums while being subject to cost containment measures in their fees. The
result is a sudden, significant decrease in the physician's personal income. 2 ALI STUDY,
supra at 113-19. One proposed solution is "enterprise liability," where the financial burden of medical malpractice is shifted from the individual physician to the health care
organization in which the physician practices. Id.
113. Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th
181, 192, 832 P.2d 924, 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 215 (1992).
114. See Justice Mosk's concurrence and dissent. Id. at 193, 832 P.2d at 932, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 216.
115. Such contact made without consent is a battery. Battery is defined as "[a]
harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause the
plaintiff or a third person to suffer such a contact, or apprehension that such a contact is
imminent." KEETON ET AL.. supra note 18, at 39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 13 (1965)).
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person's level of understanding. 116 Patients trust that the medical
provider will perform only those bodily contacts which are necessary
to diagnose and treat the illness or injury."" With the exception of
an emergency situation, a health care provider's privilege to treat the
patient extends only as far as the patient's consent." 8 When the
medical provider has consent to perform one type of treatment aid
subsequently performs a substantially different type of treatment, a
battery has occurred." 9 Traditionally, health care providers are liable for punitive damages in these cases of battery. 2 0
The question presented by the Central Pathology decision is
whether it is fair to subject these patients to the additional procedural burdens imposed by the statute. One view is that imposing
such a burden is fair because not all cases of medical battery justify
punitive damages. 2 ' On the other hand, there is something troubling
about protecting a health care provider solely because the alleged
injury was a direct result of the provider's treatment of the plaintiff,
when that treatment was one which the plaintiff did not want.' 22
This is distinguishable from situations in which the results of treatment may be damaging, but the injuries are a direct result of treatment the plaintiff sought and desired. As currently construed, the
116. The personal nature of the relationship between doctor and patient presents
an interesting conflict. On the one hand, patients want to develop trust, confidence, and a
comfortable relationship with their physician, and are less likely to file a malpractice
claim. On the other hand, once a claim is filed the physician often feels personally attacked, and the claim has a stigmatizing effect on the physician's practice and self-esteem. See generally, I ALI STUDY. supra note 112, at 297.
117. This includes the duty to disclose, which is a function of the trust, confidence,
and dependence of the patient. See generally, Nelson v. Gaunt, 125 Cal. App. 3d 623,
634, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173 (1981) (allowing the patient to maintain actions against a
doctor who injected silicone into the patient's breast without disclosing what he was injecting, or its risks).
118. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239, 502 P.2d 1, 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511
(1972) (discussing the implications of a battery versus negligence claim in a case involving whether the doctor's failure to disclose all the inherent risks of a surgical procedure
vitiated the plaintiff's consent to operate).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
121. Feister v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 223, 234, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 156
(1991), review granted, 824 P.2d 570, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 764 (1991), and review dismissed
838 P.2d 781, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (1992). Punitive damages are not warranted unless
there is clear and convincing evidence establishing a culpable state of mind. Id.
122. According to Justice Mosk, "A plaintiff should not be required to beg the
court's permission to seek any or all of those damages merely because the battery arises
out of medical services provided by the defendant when the services were neither sought
nor desired." Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th
181, 193, 832 P.2d 932, 928, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 216 (1992) (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).

statute does not distinguish between these patients. If the procedural
burden is to be lifted from patients injured by unconsented-to treatment, the legislature ought to amend the statute. For example, the
phrase "arising out of the professional negligence of a health care
provider" could be limited to include only those actions based on
treatment for which the plaintiff has manifested consent. Under this
approach, the extent of the procedural burden in pleading punitive
damages would depend on the nature of the health care provider's
conduct. Egregious conduct, such as an unconsented-to procedure,
can be better deterred by removing the procedural restrictions of section 425.13.111 The potential for punitive damage liability for unconsented-to procedures would encourage better communication
between the physician and patient, thereby ultimately reducing the
number of these types of injuries and claims.
E. Implicationsfor the Construction of Other Statutes
Three statutes pertaining to damages enacted under MICRA are
directly affected by the Central Pathology decision. Section 3333.2
of the Civil Code limits noneconomic damages' 24 to $250,000 in
"any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence."'25 Section 3333.1 of the Civil Code allows evidence of benefits paid to the plaintiff from other sources to be
admissible in actions based on professional negligence.'26 Although
it has been argued that the legislature made a distinction between
the phrases "based on" and "arising out of,"' 127 the California Supreme Court in Central Pathology determined that there is no distinction between the two phrases. 12 8 Therefore, the scope of sections
3333.1 and 3333.2 of the Civil Code has probably been broadened to
include actions alleging intentional torts, provided that the basis for
123. Physician behavior in failing to obtain adequate patient consent should be
contrasted with the more common causes of medical injury - inadvertent mistakes,
slipups, and momentary inattention - which is the type of behavior unlikely to be deterred by the tort system. See 1 ALI STUDY, supra note 112, at 298.
124. Damages for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, and disfigurement. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(a) (West Supp. 1993).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1993). Section 3333.1 abolishes the
"collateral source rule" where evidence of insurance benefits paid to an injured plaintiff
are not admissible to reduce damages because of the policy against allowing a wrongful
defendant to benefit from prudent financial planning by the plaintiff. See Selected 1975
Legislation, supra note 4, at 547.
127. See Feister v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 223, 233-34, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
150, 156 (1991), review granted, 824 P.2d 570, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 764 (1991), and review
dismissed, 838 P.2d 781, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (1992) (construing "arising out of" as a
broader phrase encompassing all possible causes of action flowing from the provider's
treatment of the patient).
128. Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th
181, 187 n.3, 832 P.2d 924, 928 n.3, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 212 n.3 (1992).
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the claim arises from the health care provider's treatment of the
plaintiff.
Section 667.7 of the Civil Procedure Code permits periodic payment of future damages,129 provided the damages are over $50,000
in "any action for injury or damages against a provider of health
care services."' 30 This statute is broader than section 425.13 of the
Civil Procedure Code, and sections 3333.1 and 3333.2 of the Civil
Code because there is no limiting phrase "arising out of" or "based
on." Therefore, there is even a stronger argument for allowing large
judgments for future damages caused by intentional torts to be paid
in periodic installments, if the injury was caused by the health care
provider's treatment of the plaintiff.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior

Court, the California Supreme Court construed section 425.13 of the
Civil Procedure Code broadly to ensure that all claims for punitive
damages against a health care provider will fall within the statute,
provided the injuries are directly related to the provision of professional services. The supreme court based its holding on its conclusion
that the legislative intent was to protect health care providers from
frivolous and unsubstantiated claims for punitive damages, regardless of the theory of liability.
The implications of this decision include the broadening of other
statutes concerning damage awards in medical malpractice cases.
Section 3333.2 of the Civil Code, limiting noneconomic damages to
$250,000, and section 3333.1 of the Civil Code, allowing admission
of evidence of collateral benefits paid to the plaintiff, will both be
expanded to include injuries caused by intentional torts, if the injuries are directly related to the provision of medical services. Additionally, section 667.7 of the Civil Procedure Code, allowing periodic
payment for future damages over $50,000, will also include actions
alleging intentional torts, if the injuries are directly related to the
provision of medical services. Ultimately, there will be less incentive
for plaintiff's lawyers to take on these cases if the damage awards
are limited in a broad manner.
In all future cases where the underlying injury is caused by the
129.

"'Future damages' includes damages for future medical treatment, care or

custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering ...
" CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7(e)(1) (West 1987).

130. Id. § 667.7(a).

health care provider's treatment, the plaintiff must comply with the
statute. This would include claims where the injury was caused by a
treatment for which the plaintiff did not consent. If this group of
plaintiffs are to avoid the additional procedural burdens imposed by
the statute, the legislature should amend the statute to allow for
their exclusion.
RUSSELL A. GOLD

